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ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION IN MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
Hans Bruining and Mike Wright
 1  
 
This paper focuses on the development of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) after a management 
buy-out (MBO) and on the role played by venture capital firms in enhancing EO. It presents 
results of two exploratory case studies of divisional buy-outs with regard to their EO and the 
areas where the venture capital firm (VC) has been of greatest help. We discuss their contribution 
to elements of the EO of the buy-out firm. The key output is expected to be a better understanding 
of the functioning and operations of the VC with regard to their contribution to the EO of the firm 
after an MBO. This will also benefit the management team that seeks venture capital support to 
improve the firm’s economic performance by using its upside potential. 
 




Buy-outs have traditionally been viewed as involving firms in mature sectors with few investment 
demands and low growth prospects (Jensen 1989). However, the main rationale for buy-outs has 
shifted from cost reduction and strategic reorientation in mature sectors to creating value in 
technology sectors through product development and innovation (Wright et al. 2000,2001). A 
shift is occurring in the buyout market from downside protection in deals led by LBO associations 
to VCs that look for the upside potential of firms. The market is moving to find added value in 
deals, because auctions increase deal prices and fund providers are looking for higher returns. 
Research from the US, UK and Continental Europe shows that buy-outs are often followed by 
increase in (new) product development (Zahra 1995; Wright et al. 1992; Bruining 1992). In the 
US, traditional LBO associations have been joining forces with VCs for this reason.   
 
Many VCs label themselves today as long term committed and active shareholders that have a 
'buy-and-build' strategy. In our view long term committed venture capitalists have a focus on 
value creation in the business and supply additional capital for internal growth and/or 
acquisitions. Being an active investor implies a need for development of in-house technical 
expertise about the business and management support and creates prospects for VCs and buy-out 
firms to link (Wright et al. 2000). In contrast to studies that highlight the role of the venture 
capitalist in start-up firms, research about how the role of the venture capitalist (VC) fits into this 
newer growth orientation in management buyouts is lacking. This article aims to fill this gap by 
analysing the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship in two mature buy-out firms in order to 
obtain insight concerning where and how the VCs commitment contributes to the entrepreneurial 
practices in the MBO firm. The study examines the questions: how do MBOs improve their 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and to what extent does the venture capitalist contribute to the 
EO of the buy-out firm?   
 
Our theoretical framework uses the EO concept of Lumpkin and Dess (1996:152) which 
conceptualises the relationship between entrepreneurial practices and firm performance. We 
highlight the role of the venture capitalist as a long-term committed and active shareholder and 
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extend conceptualisation of how environmental and organisational variables impact the EO-
performance relationship in the context of buy-outs.  
 
The structure of this article is as follows: after defining an MBO, we link the MBO to the EO 
framework and highlight the VC role along the EO dimensions. We explain our research 
methodology and data gathering in the following section. From two case studies we analyse the 
role of the VC after the MBO and its potential to contribute to the EO of the firm. In a 
comparative analysis of the case studies we explain differences in the way VCs arrange post-




An MBO involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring a significant equity 
stake as individuals with institutional support in order to control the company (Robbie and Wright 
1996).  
 
The structuring of a buy-out involves the introduction of significant equity incentives for the 
entrepreneurs involved, together with substantial external funding and active monitoring by 
investors (Jensen 1993, Wright et al. 1994) in order to control agency costs. The emphasis in buy-
outs in the US has typically focused on the debt providers who provide substantial amounts of 
leverage. However, in Europe venture capital firms play a major role in funding buy-outs. In the 
UK, for example, the vast majority of buy-outs with a transaction value above £5 million involve 
venture capital finance (CMBOR, 2001). In the Netherlands, the value of private equity backed 
buy-outs amounted to €3,457 mn in 1998 and € 4,463 mn in 1999 (CMBOR, 2000) (Table 1). 
 
MBOs backed by venture capital lead to significant changes in a firm’s ownership composition, 
and can contribute to subsequent growth and changes in strategy, organisational structure and 
entrepreneurial practices (Reid 1996, EVCA 2001). This is especially the case in those MBOs 
which are not traditionally perceived as an organisational efficiency tool to streamline processes 
and decrease unit costs (Wright et al. 2000). 
  
Extensive screening by venture capitalists at the time of investment appraisal places considerable 
emphasis on the entrepreneurial skills of the managers leading a proposed buy-out or buy-in 
(Robbie and Wright 1995). VCs that have a reputation to provide capital for growth, use long 
term incentives to encourage process or incremental innovation by managers and show good 
understanding of the industry and business in the post-investment period, will attract most of 
these deals. The extent to which VCs are able to enhance EO in their investees is the subject of 
this article.  
 
[Insert table 1 about here]  
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION   
 
To focus on the involvement of the VC in promoting the entrepreneurial upside potential of an 
MBO firm, we use the EO model of Lumpkin and Dess (1996:152). We define the EO 
dimensions and show how these link to MBOs. We also identify the range of areas where the VCs 
are more likely to intervene in the various elements of the model. 
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EO-Dimensions 
EO highlights practices, decision-making styles and methods managers use to let firms act 
entrepreneurially and offers an opportunity to examine where the VC contributes to enhancing the 
firm's upside potential. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argue that an entrepreneurial firm is any firm 
that engages in an effective combination of five dimensions. First, innovativeness is the tendency 
of an organisation to engage in and to support new ideas, novelty, experimentation and creative 
processes that result in new products, services or technological processes. In this study we include 
in this definition incremental product/service innovation because this also opens windows of 
opportunity for the firm. Second, proactiveness involves the process of anticipating and acting on 
future needs by seeking new opportunities, introducing new products ahead of competition, and 
strategically eliminating declining operations. Third, competitive aggressiveness is a firm's 
propensity to outperform industry rivals in the marketplace. Fourth, risk taking, is the degree to 
which managers are willing to make large and risky resource commitments. Fifth, autonomy is 
the extent to which a team or an individual in the firm is free to bring forward and implement a 
vision or an idea. 
 
These process dimensions are intermediate factors between external (environmental) and internal 
(organisational) variables that drive firm performance and lead to 'new entry', the essential act of 
entrepreneurship. At the firm level, new entry involves actions initiated by the firm to promote 
upside potential and the strengthening of competitive advantage. As such, the EO concept offers 
an additional explanation for performance improvement following buy-out that goes beyond 
agency cost arguments involving efficiency improvement to protect the firm against downside 
risks (Phan and Hill 1995). In buyouts which need at least some innovation, environmental and 
organisational factors play an important moderating role in enhancing the EO of the firm.  
 
Environmental factors 
Several environmental variables moderate the entrepreneurship-firm performance relationship. 
The EO-firm performance relationship is positively/negatively moderated by the extent of 
hostility in the firm’s environment. It is wellknown that managers pre-MBO face investment 
restrictions from HQ because their firms are peripheral to the product line of the parent company 
(Wright et al. 2001). This decreases the possibilities of responding entrepreneurially to market 
development. After the buy-out this situation is reversed. The same can be argued for the other 
environmental factor dynamism. This variable expresses the extent to which the needs of 
customers change and the extent to which technology changes. Pre-MBO, buy-out firms, if they 
are peripheral to the core business of the parent, are not allowed to have growth-oriented 
strategies and organisations. This conflict between subsidiary management and HQ is often an 
indication that a buy-out may be appropriate (Bruining 1992, Wright et al. 2001). 
 
Other environmental factors in the model are heterogeneity and technological sophistication. The 
first expresses the diversity in customer needs and expectations, thus offering a firm many or few 
opportunities for additional innovation and market development. Heterogeneity can enable firms 
to apply lessons learned in one market to other markets. Technological sophistication is indicative 
of more demand for new technologies.   
 
Organisational Factors 
Knowledge about the interaction between organisational factors and EO-dimensions is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of the buy-out firm and the possible supportive role of the VC. A 
significant share of MBOs divested from parent companies face changes to a more growth-
oriented  strategy  and in the process of strategy formulation. Instead of obeying orders from 
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headquarters that block innovation and investment in order to optimise goals of the diversified 
parent company, the buy-out managers have discretionary power to decide what is best for the 
business and how the business plan can be carried out most profitably for themselves as a firm 
(Wright, et al. 2001).  
 
The distance between policy and implementation becomes significantly shorter, because of the 
remarriage of ownership and control (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). It is likely that the new owner-
managers show higher levels of commitment to the implementation of a growth oriented strategy 
than before the MBO. In turn, this is likely to change the organisational culture to one that is 
more entrepreneurially driven. Other organisational factors that stimulate efficiency and 
decentralisation after buyout are the decrease in both size and complexity of the organisational 
structure (Phan and Hill 1995). Top managers experience more immediate freedom and 
independence, which enables more flexible decision-making, more delegation, quicker action and 
easier consensus among manager/owners and shareholders (Bruining 1992). This creates greater 
room at the firm level for the autonomy dimension of EO.  Buy-outs typically involve increased 
levels of external funding.  The costs of servicing debt and fixed dividend commitments act as a 
discipline to allocate resources to operations with the strongest cash flow and eliminate 
unprofitable operations. Finally, the  experience of incumbent senior management is a crucial 
basis for their ability to act entrepreneurially.  
 
This commitment to EO by the incumbent management is crucial to the development of a joint 
venture relationship with the VC that will contribute to achieving the growth objectives of the 
buy-out. 
 
VCs and Entrepreneurial Orientation 
In principle, VCs can make a contribution to the entrepreneurial orientation of their investees 
through the support they provide following investment. Previous literature suggests that VCs 
investing at early stages emphasise market growth and uniqueness of products rather than 
demonstrated market acceptance as in later stage investments (Elango et al. 1995). Amason et al. 
(1994) shows that VC involvement increases as the need arises. This is more likely in riskier, 
earlier stage deals. Supportive of this are the findings of Sapienza et al. (1994) that frequency of 
interaction depends on the degree of the CEO’s venture experience, the venture’s stage of 
development and the degree of technical innovation. 
 
Macmillan et al. (1989) find that the highest degree of involvement of the VC concerns acting as 
‘sounding board’ together with obtaining alternative sources of equity financing, interfacing with 
equity group, monitoring financial performance and obtaining alternative sources of debt. 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) stresses the consultancy nature of the role VCs play in their 
investment. Littler and Sweeting (1989) observes that VCs provide access to networks among 
suppliers, customers, competitors and backers. Venture capitalists may provide significantly more 
value added if they control the board and if they have operating rather than purely financial 
expertise (Rosenstein, et al. 1993). The contribution of non-executive directors may vary quite 
considerably (Sweeting and Wong 1997). Sahlman (1990) in comparing LBO associations with 
venture capitalists, notes that executives in the former assume control of the board of directors 
and are less likely to assume operational control than venture capitalists investing in new 
ventures.  
 
Venture capitalists, especially in Europe, may also invest in management buy-outs. Among the 
few studies to consider the role of VCs in MBOs, Wright et al (1992) report that 30% of the buy-
out managers considered VC involvement very helpful. While some 62.3% of buy-outs 
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introduced new products as a result of the greater freedom of the buy-out, the study does not 
reveal how the VCs enhanced these entrepreneurial measures. In a study of management buy-ins 
(MBI)
1, Robbie and Wright (1996) show that the efficacy of direct board representation varies 
from a proactive stance and protection of their financial position to not being able to justify 
further investment because of spending a disproportional amount of time and cost to achieve 
satisfactory restructuring. Hatherly et al. (1994) suggest that relationships between VCs and 
CEOs of buy-out firms be best characterised as a joint venture. The relationships of trust, 
openness and mutual support that prevail are arguably important in facilitating VC/CEO 
interaction on non-routine issues. A recent study by Wright et al. (2001) identifies different types 
of buyouts and suggests that different types of financial investor may have different roles to play 
in monitoring. In the more traditional highly leveraged buyouts, LBO associations may be more 
appropriate as they are adept at financial monitoring. In contrast, in buyouts requiring some 
limited form of investment and innovation (revitalisation buyouts) or involving major 
entrepreneurial innovation (entrepreneurial buyouts) venture capital firms may have a greater role 
to play as there is a need for technical as well as financial monitoring skills. 
 
This review suggests that while buy-outs have traditionally been seen as requiring less investor 
involvement than earlier stage investments, some MBOs may have significant entrepreneurial 
opportunities that require greater involvement by VCs. In particular, VCs may have an important 
role to play in developing the EO dimensions of buy-out firms.  
 
The EO model also suggests that VCs’ involvement is required in accumulating and applying 
knowledge of sector specific environmental factors such as technology, dynamism, hostility and 
the heterogeneity of markets in order to take appropriate pre- and post-investment decisions. 
Alliances with venture capital funds may be an important route to gain early access to 
developments emerging from the fast moving Internet and communications sectors. 
 
With respect to organisational factors, compared to the relationship with head office before the 
buy-out, greater interaction is expected to take place between the board of directors, key 
managers and the VC. Monitoring by VCs, together with substantial management equity stakes, 
are expected to be primary factors in meeting the costs of servicing external finance and in taking 
entrepreneurial actions associated with the generation of enhanced cash flow. The VC may play a 
key role in scrutinising the expertise of management, with only those able to develop the newly 
independent firm likely to be acceptable as equity holding insiders to the VC (Robbie and Wright, 
1996).  
 
The next section explains the research methodology and data gathering process adopted in the 
study in order to address these issues.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA GATHERING  
 
The empirical evidence is based on two detailed case studies. A two-stage research approach was 
carried out during 1998. After piloting a questionnaire in three MBOs, supplemented with face-
to-face interviews, information was first gathered information from CEOs by questionnaires 
(available from the author on request). The questionnaire contained 5-point Likert scale questions 
with regard to external and organisational factors that may affect the relationship between EO and 
buy-out performance. The questions referred to the period of two years before and two years after 
the MBO. The MBOs selected had 50-100 employees and the deal prices varied between Dfl 5-10 
million. The firms were divested by their Dutch parent companies by means of an MBO. 
Choosing MBO firms from the period 1992-1995, allowed sufficient time for the operational, 
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organisational and strategic consequences of the change in ownership to be implemented. Another 
criteria for selection was that the firms had to be venture capital backed by leading Dutch VCs, all 
of whom are experienced in financing buy-outs. These VCs were involved from the very start of 
the MBO and have representatives who are chairmen of the supervisory board, guaranteeing that 
they are well informed about the likely development of entrepreneurial practices and their 
relationship with the CEO.   
 
The operationalization of the variables in the conceptual model was based on measures taken 
from the widely used studies of Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin (1986 and 1989). After 
completion of the questionnaire more detailed face-to-face interviews were conducted with the 
CEOs. Other sources of information used included magazines, product development brochures, 
annual reports and, in one case, the flotation prospectus. This approach was adopted as a more 
appropriate instrument for capturing the complexity of the managerial, entrepreneurial and 
organisational changes taking place following the transfers of ownership (Green 1992). Full 
reports of the case studies were sent for comments to the CEOs.  
 
This exercise laid the basis for the second part of the research. The EO profiles of the CEOs were 
subsequently sent for comments to the representatives of the respective VCs, who included the 
chairmen of the supervisory board and the investment manager
2. Interviews were conducted with 
both to triangulate views about changes in the EO profile following buy-out (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Post-MBO both VC representatives remain in contact with each other and receive the same 
financial information. In addition to the EO-questionnaire, a second set of questions, based on the 
work of Rosenstein et al (1993) and Mitchell et al (1999), was used in face-to-face interviews to 
focus on the venture capital firms’ practices and their specific information requirements in the 
operational and strategic monitoring of the investee (checklist available from author on request). 
This enabled identification of the areas where venture capitalists gave assistance to the CEO and 
his management team to act more entrepreneurially. 
 
MBO firms were selected that showed strong differences with respect to VC's governance system, 
exit strategy and the voting position of management based on their equity stakes. In case study 1 
the VC used a dual governance system, had a majority equity stake and was aiming at a trade sale 
exit. In case study 2, the VC used no dual governance, had a minority equity stake and was 
aiming at exit through a flotation. Using information from these two distinct cases we expect to 
highlight the role of the VC along all EO dimensions more transparently (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Coupled with within-case analysis we also carried out cross-case comparisons. 
 
CASE STUDY RESULTS 
 
For each case, this section first presents a synopsis of its main features and, based on information 
post-MBO, identifies the changes in dimensions of EO, and the VC's role post-MBO along these 
changes and dimensions. Second, a cross-case comparison is developed to analyse differences 
and similarities in the contribution of the VCs to the EO of the buy-out firms. 
 
Case study 1  
 
Synopsis 
Company 1 is a pet food manufacturer with Dfl 60 mn turnover and 60 employees, it exports 90 
percent of its products to the expanding markets for pet food in Scandinavia, Germany, Belgium, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. Company 1 was bought by its management team for Dfl 8.5 mn in 
1995 from the parent company Cebeco-Handelsraad, a large co-operative firm producing 
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vegetables, flowers, breeding and food. Alpinvest, which was recently acquired by NIB-Capital 
and which has 41 percent of its total investment portfolio of Dfl 300m invested in MBOs/MBIs, 
backed the company. The firm’s target rate of return for MBOs is 15-40 percent on an annualised 
basis. The pet food producer belongs to the mid-range size of Alpinvest investments. Alpinvest 
owns 43 percent of the shares, another large Dutch VC, NPM Capital also has 43 percent, 
whereas a minority (14%) is owned by the CEO, the financial controller and the director of 
production. At the time of the buy-out the financial leverage measured by equity to total assets 
was 42%. Seven years after the buy-out the firm was sold in 2001 to Profima, one of Europe's 
largest pet food producers. Alpinvest and NPM Capital distinguish between an investment 
manager who does the deal and a supervisory board member taking care of operational post-
investment activities. However, the investment managers receive the same financial information 
about the firm as the member of the Supervisory Board and stays in contact with the latter. 
Alpinvest’s representative is the chairman of the supervisory board and has a background as a 
consultant and entrepreneur in the industry. From the very start of the MBO, a modest 6 percent 
dividend was paid, indicating a longer-term investment attitude of the VC firm to let Company 1 
first repay the debt and allow investments to improve the business, without neglecting the reward 
for the new shareholders. After paying off the amount of debt and amortisation of "goodwill" the 
payout of dividends increased. The following sections discuss EO dimensions, environmental and 
organisational factors and the contribution of the VC to developing EO as outlined earlier with 
respect to this case. 
 
EO Dimensions 
The companies parent CEBECO paid little attention to Company 1's new product ideas because 
pet food was peripheral to its main focus on vegetables and flowers. This changed after the MBO, 
as management became more proactive in both product development and rationalisation. The 
company started developing new products on its own. The trend towards humanising animals 
created ample opportunity for increasing quality and product margins. This increased the firm’s 
proactiveness. The company as a small player had to act smart in its efforts to differentiate and 
develop new products. The ENMAX exhibition in Chicago became an integral part for the 
product innovation program of the firm. Active search for new opportunities required an increase 
in expenditures for research and development by more than 50 percent. After the MBO the firm 
renewed its equipment for the production of varying percentages of fat in order to anticipate 
healthier animal snacks for the whole animal life-cycle without adding colouring agents. One of 
its new successful products was the puppy-snack. This is evidence of strengthening 
innovativeness.  
 
Following the MBO there was an increase in autonomy at the workgroup level. Pre-MBO the 
CEO as subsidiary director was responsible for the marketing, production and financial decisions 
at the operational but not the strategic level. This changed  after the MBO but he was forced to 
listen to younger ambitious specialists in the fields of marketing and nutrition of which he lacks 
understanding.  
 
Management became more willing to take risks. Top management developed a strategic focus on 
RandD, indicating a preference for projects which could yield relatively higher added value (ROI) 
and thus a higher return on investment than was the case before the MBO.  A high price/quality 
strategy was adopted that signalled the firm’s increased competitive aggressiveness. The role of 
marketing changed. The marketing department had to obtain orders from superstores and 
convince them of the healthier status of the company’s products, and had to be more active in 
gathering product ideas from the industry itself. In dealing with the competitors after the MBO 
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the company typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, targeting peripheral markets, e.g. the 
Finnish market where it succeeded in becoming market leader within six months of the MBO.   
 
Environment 
In order to differentiate oneself in the pet food industry, technology is a key factor. Products and 
the related technologies become obsolete rather quickly, because of the need for frequent 
innovations involving healthy pet food products. Consumer tastes are fairly easy to predict but 
competitor actions are becoming more unpredictable. Although hostility is not seen as a threat for 
survival in the short term, the danger of price competition remains in the home market.  
 
Organisational Factors 
Before the MBO management did not focus on the firm’s core competencies and its objectives. 
After the MBO, the management developed a clear strategy, mission and vision as a niche-player 
in order to grow internally in the expanding markets for pet food. Ideas for new products now 
originate more from visits to important international industry conferences such as the Chicago pet 
food exhibition. The RandD function is crucial to creating a strong position by changing the food 
ingredients needed in a timely manner. The firm now takes a longer-term perspective for planning 
its future growth. Investment proposals are carried out on the basis of own cash flows, indicating 
the need for profitable growth and attractive payout figures on which realistic budgets can be 
made.  
  
More things had to be done after the MBO by the same amount of people, causing a need to 
delegate by installing self-managing teams. After the MBO, communication developed more 
intensively between the management team and employees because management was forced to 
adopt the latest developments from RandD and marketing. Despite his autocratic style of 
leadership, the CEO changed his attitude towards the RandD and marketing function, whereas 
before the MBO he considered this primarily as a cost. Several innovation working groups and 
quality platforms were installed with regular meetings. These groups determined the direction for 
product development. Ideas for product development are developed during brainstorming sessions 
between teams of workers and management. In this sense the organisation became flatter and 
adopted a stronger results oriented attitude towards work. However, the planning of capital 
expenditures as well as the use of operational budgets are examples of the drive for tight 
centralised financial control after the MBO and thus the need for more formalisation. 
 
After the MBO the company began to imitate new products launched by international leading pet 
food firms such as Hills in the US. It also started it own new product development. Compared to 
its competitors, time to market has been reduced from nine to approximately six months, because 
after the MBO the firm has targeted foreign niche markets to minimise the problems of price 
competition in its home market. By hiring engineers from the Agriculture University of 
Wageningen the firm was able to anticipate the new technological developments necessary to 
produce improved animal food for these niche markets. The emphasis on the top quality pet food 
segment of the market required increasing efforts to qualify for international standards 
organisation (ISO) certificates and the more recently acquired Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Point. New quality control procedures were introduced. The drive for tight cost control after the 
MBO resulted in better control of costs and working capital. E.g. accounts receivable decreased 
by 17% (e.g. Dfl 580.000). These kinds of activities enable the firm to undertake investment in 
contrast to before the MBO. 
 
While top management considers that it has the same degree of experience compared to pre-
MBO, there have been important changes in management development. E.g. the supervisory 
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board has been very constructive in developing the focus of the CEO from a predominant 
emphasis on the bottom line to broader more professional management. It is notable that not all 
disciplines are represented in the management board of Company 1. The sales manager and the 
nutritionist are both not formally part of the management team, but attend on request. The director 
of finance also became the director of human resources in the post buy-out period. Most of the 
employees are not rewarded in relation to performance. However, besides equity stakes the CEO 
and his financial controller and deputy directors of production enjoy profit related payments. In 
1996 bonuses amounted to approximately Dfl 150,000 each. Top management is clearly better 
incentivised than before the MBO. 
 
Net profit as a percentage of sales of Company 1 improved dramatically after the buy-out in 1995 
(Table 2). The divestment of the Soya business decreased sales but not the firm's profitability. In 
1995, the year after the MBO, a substantially higher level of net profit was reached due to the 
higher margin strategy. In 1997 net profit decreased with 20% because of increased input prices 
reduced profit margins. In 1998 this situation was reversed.  
 




VC and Entrepreneurial Orientation  
The VC contributed to developing proactiveness by approving and stimulating the 
implementation of a value added strategy. With regard to another aspect of proactiveness the VC 
also played an important advisory role in discussions about decisions to cut unprofitable 
activities. He actively suggested that the firm invested in a non-stop production process facility, 
to decreased its workforce (5 people) and divested the Soya beans unit, thus rationalising 
production in order to realise higher margins.  
 
The VC played an important role in promoting innovativeness since, in the period immediately 
following the MBO, it reviewed the quality of the RandD plans several times a year. Later on, 
because of the satisfactory results, the involvement of the VC decreased to once a year, and 
focused on the status of projects. The VC stimulated Dfl 1 million of investment in management 
information systems. These systems included the introduction of barcodes and software packages 
as well as systems covering the understanding, control and distribution of information.  
 
The VC played an important informal role in stimulating the development of autonomy since at 
the VC's instigation, a process was introduced whereby proposals were initiated by the marketing 
manager and ratified and monitored by management and the VC. The VC approved the direction 
of the marketing plan, paying particular attention to pricing and sales forecasts, which was 
important in achieving financial control of the strategy. 
A characteristic of this case was the intervention of the VC in the sales strategy following the 
MBO. This happened during 1997 when Company 1 faced downward pressure on product 
margins due to higher purchase prices of raw material that could not be passed on to customers. 
An extremely important consequence was that the investment program based on internal finance 
was endangered. The management board and the VC in the supervisory board discussed whether 
to stop the investment program and accept the lower margin on sales or to keep the investment 
program in operation and focus sales effort at the higher price/quality segment of the market. The 
VC succeeded in convincing the buy-out team of the usefulness of a higher added value strategy 
for Company 1 and in maintaining a focus on sales effort aimed at the higher price/quality 
segment. In this way, the VC also contributed to increasing management’s willingness to take 
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risks. Moreover, with the help of the VC the attention of management shifted from mere price to 
more quality driven competition.  
 
This evidence indicates that he VC stimulated the entrepreneurial practices initiated after the 
MBO in order to control the projected economic performance of the venture. The intervention by 
the VC in Company 1's business strategy corrected the actions of top management team in a 
timely manner. In this case the management had to learn to carry out a new value added strategy 
and re-allocate resources in order to anticipate effectively trends in technology, markets and 
specific dangers such as increased price competition. RandD sources from own cash flow, 
product development and marketing plans, management information system, leadership style of 
the CEO, delegation and performance related rewards for the buy-out managers are seen as 
enablers of developing appropriate levels of EO and involved the VC from the start of the MBO.  
 
Case study 2 
 
Synopsis 
Company 2 is a manufacturer of Computer Aided Design (CAD) and Computer Aided 
Manufacturing (CAM) systems and creates one-stop solutions for the carpet, printed textiles and 
woven fabrics industries. It develops, manufactures and markets dedicated software and services 
for textile design, colour matching, colour separation, fabric simulation, 3D presentation and 
production of textiles. Turnover is Dfl 13 mn of which 70% is exported. Besides these systems 
the firm is also a producer of Geographic Information Systems for municipalities. The company 
operates in a relatively young niche market where technology is changing very fast and price-
competition is very fierce. With headquarters based in The Netherlands, offices in the UK, France 
and the US with a worldwide agent network Company 2 positions itself to market and sell its 
products on a worldwide scale. 
 
The company was backed by Gilde Investment which is based in Utrecht and is one of the leading 
investment banks in the Netherlands. From its buy-out fund 74 percent is invested in MBOs 
totalling approximately ƒ300 mn. Company 2 belongs to the middle range class of Gilde's 
investments with a target rate of return between 20-30%. The total amount of equity invested in 
Company 2 by Gilde was ƒ 5-mn equity, giving it a minority stake of 36%. Top management and 
20 employees hold a majority stake of 64%. The financial leverage measured by equity to total 
assets was 24% at the time of the buy-out. The firm was bought for an undisclosed sum from the 
receivership of HCS Technology, which went bankrupt in 1992. In this case the investment 
manager of Gilde is also chairman of the supervisory board and is an experienced financial 
consultant in the IT sector. Six years after the buy-out, the intended flotation was realised in 1998.  
The following sections discuss EO dimensions, environmental and organisational factors and the 
contribution of the VC to developing EO as outlined earlier with respect to this case. 
 
EO Dimensions 
Reducing the time from the initial stage of product development to final production is essential 
for competitiveness in Company 2’s market. Before the buy-out, Company 2 was not capable of 
seizing these opportunities and offering one-stop solutions. After the MBO, the firm increased its 
efforts to search for new opportunities, and proactively developed new business opportunities in 
existing and related markets. At the same time, contracts with suppliers were renegotiated and 
catering costs were decreased by about 60%. People not able to work in an independent company 
left. Another example of looking for chances to be ahead of the competition, was the acquisition 
of a French firm specialised in certain weaving techniques, which was used to acquire and 
develop further new technology and to increase market share in France.  
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Post-MBO product developments demonstrated the firm’s innovative  focus on improving 
communication, networking and multi-media solutions in computer graphics technology and 
textile technology. The successful launch of new CAD/CAM software Tuft/NT to produce 
complex carpet designs also demonstrates innovativeness. Further examples of new products are 
the shrink-wrapped Fashion Flash software, DesignCom software for using design data in other 
applications and NedGeoDatawarehouse to store geographical and alphanumerical data. Since the 
MBO the number of software developers has increased from 20 to 30 (25 percent of the total 
staff) and substantial investments were made in RandD development (between 7 and 10 % of its 
annual revenues). After the MBO there was more room for bottom-up communication and quick 
decision-making, resulting in a richer stream of business proposals with regard to acquisitions and 
equipment from the business units, thus stimulating autonomy regarding entrepreneurial 
initiatives. There was a shift towards more flexible use of formal rules and procedures in the firm.  
  
There was a major change in competitive aggressiveness. Company 2 aims to be first with 
initiatives in the market with substantial lowering of prices. The marketing stance is encapsulated 
in the advertising slogan: ‘We would have released our windows/NT based software sooner, but 
we were too busy leaving our competition behind!’ Marketing has become important to determine 
the strategic direction of the firm and generates more products than before the MBO.  
 
Indicative of more risk taking following the MBO was the venture set up in the US. This was a 
very expensive lesson because this venture failed. After the failure of the start-up, the chief 
financial officer was given more authority to calculate risks of the firm's strategic decisions. From 
then on investment opportunities to expand in familiar niches were selected in Europe. After the 
buy-out Company 2 acquired several companies to expand into the carpet and the printed textile 
market in the UK, France, Belgium and in its home market.    
    
Environment 
Software production technology changes quickly and marketing practices must constantly be 
adapted to communicate better with industrial customers in order to forecast demand and 
consumer tastes adequately. Despite the strong price competition for CAD/CAM applications in 
the carpet industry world-wide and the dynamic environment, the CEO of Company 2 perceives a 
decrease in threat to survival of the firm, because after the MBO the company invests its own 
cash flow in its own future, instead of in a financially distressed parent company.  
 
Organisational Factors 
The financial distressed parent company stifled innovation and investment. After the buy-out the 
most significant changes occurred in the process and speed of strategy formulation. The longer-
term profitability of investments became more important than shorter-term returns. After the 
MBO the company formulated a mission statement for the development of textile CAD/CAM and 
GIS Systems. With regard to the former it aims to become the leading supplier of one-stop 
solutions for all market areas in the textile CAD/CAM market, by providing the most 
comprehensive product line, state-of-the-art PC/Windows/NT-based technology, a high level of 
support and competitive prices on a world-wide scale. In the field of GIS systems, the firm strives 
to be market leader in integrated 'organisation-wide' GIS solutions for municipalities in The 
Netherlands, based on an open-systems concept, universal system integration capabilities, turnkey 
solutions, a full-service concept and partnerships with users of its systems. The firm became the 
leader after the MBO in the niche markets involving carpets and printed textile, strengthening its 
market focus and enlarging its product range. The emphasis is now on standard quality and low 
prices in order to increase market share, whereas before the MBO the focus was on low prices. 
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After the MBO in 1992 Company 2 acquired several companies to expand in the US, the UK, 
France, Belgium and in its home market. The acquisitions were internally financed and 
concentrated on the standard quality segment.  
 
The company organised itself after the MBO into two independent strategic business units, 
Textile and Geographic Information Systems. Two-way-communication within each strategic 
business units have increased and the layers of organisation have decreased after the MBO. In 
contrast to before the MBO, these SBUs meet separately with top management, and if necessary 
with the VC to evaluate ideas. Instead of painful discussion with the parent company, whose main 
product line was copiers, the company’s culture supports the open expression of novel ideas after 
the MBO, in contrast to the situation beforehand where the CEO was forced to slowdown new 
business proposals because the directors of the financially troubled parent were not willing to 
invest in businesses they did not know  
 
Without the financial limitations imposed by its former parent and with savings on overhead of 
approximately Dfl 500,000 a year (2% of its sales revenue) and fewer restrictions on financial 
resources, the firm has experienced more freedom to make investments. After the MBO personnel 
are better incentivised. Twenty key managers now have equity stakes. Half the employees (40) of 
the sales department received a refined performance related reward system and all employees of 
Company 2 are given a performance-related bonus in their salary. This relationship was also 
intensified through arrangements made on an individual basis for those who show ambition to 
develop certain parts of the market abroad (e.g.Turkey). Other aspects of performance related pay 
are aimed at enhancing product development. Employees earn a bonus when they keep product 
development and maintenance time within certain limits.  
 
The CEO and the CFO have experience with all business functions, but not all disciplines are 
represented in the management board. The SBU managers of GIS and Textile CAD/CAM, 
responsible for respectively marketing and sales, project engineering, product development and 
customer support, as well as the HRM manager are not formally part of the management board, 
but attend on request. The characteristic of the top management team remained the same as before 
the MBO. The CEO was seen in general as a charismatic leader with a strong influence on 
Company 2 employees.  
 
The years immediately following the buy-out showed the strongest increase in EBIT as % of 
sales. Despite the failed start-up investment in 1995 in the US it is clear from Table 3 that 
Company 2 showed improved performance post-1992. However, sales growth during 1995-1998 
was not spectacular.    
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
In 1998 the company was successfully floated on the NMAX stock exchange. In 2000 the textile 
and apparel and E-commerce activity are suffering lower demand and tough price competition as 
a result of market saturation.  
 
VC and Entrepreneurial Orientation  
The VC supported the firm’s increased efforts to proactively develop new business opportunities 
in existing and related markets. In 1995 the VC assisted the CEO to start an IT company in the 
US and led a consortium of investors to finance that investment. In the stressful period of 
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reorganising the existing firm due to a sharp fall in profit in 1995 and starting a company abroad 
the VC was actively involved in advising management. With respect to greater autonomy, the VC 
has monthly talks with business unit management, indicating scope for informality. As strategy 
was not very coherent at the time of the MBO, an INSEAD professor was asked to join the 
Supervisory Board at the request of the VC to advise on how to address this problem. 
  
With respect to decision-making information used in Company 2, the VC did not directly 
intervene in daily operations. Prior to the buy-out, the operating decision-making information 
used internally and reported to the VC came from marketing and sales. Subsequent to VC 
involvement, operating decision information was required with regard to finance and personnel. 
The VC is involved with the operations of the firm through the monitoring of financial 
information, but its involvement extends further to include the development of strategic decision-
making information about acquisitions, product development and marketing actions. The VC’s 
networks are used extensively for advising management. The VC assisted closely in making 
acquisition decisions, carrying out five acquisitions in Europe. To implement the marketing 
strategy the VC was assisted by a Flemish venture capitalist who took an equity stake in the major 
competitor Sofis, based in Belgium, in order to block competition. Other tasks where the VC 
showed commitment were counselling for product development and marketing programs, but also 
in stressful situations during an IT start-up in the US and early reorganisation following the buy-
out firm, and last but not least the preparation of flotation. These services enhance most of the EO 
dimensions of the firm.  
 
With respect to the existing carpet and cartography niche markets the VC confirmed the CEO's 
entrepreneurial approach, but assessed the CEO's vision as too narrow in scope to realise 
diversification opportunities in technology related markets. The VC tried to create awareness for 
the relatively small market size and the slow pace of long-term growth and undertook efforts to 
renew this strategy.  However, the lack of a hierarchical relationship, resulting from the minority 
shareholding of the VC, limited powerful interaction with top management. The CEO and the VC 
looked at proposals but did not find anything worthwhile to invest in. According to the VC the 
CEO was too risk averse in this respect. This was largely due to the fact that in the first two years 
the VC was the only member in the supervisory board representing a minority shareholding. 
Therefore the VC could neither provoke action nor promote dynamism to convince others of the 
right course of action.    
 
COMPARISON OF EO IN COMPANIES 1 AND 2 
In both cases we found evidence of actions on the part of the VC to realise long-term benefits. 
Management and the VC of Company 1 decided to pay a moderate annual dividend of 6 percent 
from the start and concentrated on repayment of debt and preparation of the firm for a trade sale. 
In Company 2, the VC supported the CEOs initiatives for a start-up and required payment of a 
dividend above a 25 percent return on equity. After a period of growth, the VC prepared the 
company for floatation. In both firms the VCs were shareholders for a six or seven-year period, 
demonstrating that they were relatively long term-committed shareholders. Both cases pre-MBO 
are firms not central strategically to their parents and therefore deprived of investments for 
innovation and renewal purposes. Using the categorisation of Wright et al. (2000), Company 1 
can be identified as a revitalisation buyout as it involved process and incremental innovations 
while Company 2 is an entrepreneurial buyout involving strategic innovation.  
 
The extent to which the VCs showed a similar pattern of activities in both companies that 
enhanced the EO of the firms will now be discussed. Table 4 summarises the different VC 
governance characteristics and effects found in the case studies.  
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In both companies major interventions by the VC took place during the buy-out. At Company 1 
the intervention by the VC to adhere to the strategy of value adding convinced the CEO and was 
successful in contrast to the efforts of the VC in Company 2 to broaden the CEOs view of the 
market scope of the firm. In Company 1 this likely increased commitment in the inter-
organisational relationship between the VC and the CEO. (Carnevale and Isen 1986), producing 
more innovative solutions. For Company 2 this appeared only valid at the start of the MBO, as 
shown by the launch of the new IT-firm in the US. This failure might have increased the risk 
aversion of the CEO, because in the years following the MBO, he became reluctant to change the 
market scope of the firm. Affective commitment in the relationship may have become more 
problematic from that moment on. Both findings appear to be consistent with the respective 
influence of VCs on the CEO's leadership styles. In Company 1 the problematic authoritarian 
style of the CEO changed in order to integrate the contribution of specialist managers' to product- 
and market development. In Company 2 the strong charismatic leadership of the CEO did not 
generate potential successors from within the firm. 
 
In Company 1 the VC brought in an experienced entrepreneur in the food industry as a business 
consultant, whereas the VC of Company 2 is a financial specialist in IT business. Both are 
experienced in developing strategies with the board of directors, but the former possesses more 
awareness of operational details. The absence of an external specialist at Company 1 in the field 
of strategy and implementation in contrast to Company 2 supports this observation. Convincing 
people on the basis of one's own qualities may increase mutually affective commitment in the 
post-investment relationship between CEO and VC and emotional attachment to the organisation 
in the long run. Post-investment relationship building between the VC and CEO may prosper 
more from attention to operational rather than financial detail (Rosenstein, et al. 1993). 
 
Another finding which has a likely impact on the relationship between the CEO and the VC is the 
hierarchical position of the parties to each other based on the size of their equity stakes. In the 
case of Company 2 the VC had a minority shareholding in the firm and had to wait until flotation 
when the CEO sold his equity before the firm's strategy could be adapted. The VC lacked 
hierarchical power to control top management. However, concrete proposals to invest in other 
markets were also absent. In Company 1 the VCs had a majority equity stake and were able to 
supervise the necessary changes before the exit of the firm. At the time of the trade sale exit of 
Company 1 the CEO retired. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The VCs differ also in the way they organised post-investment assistance. In both cases, post-
investment involvement went beyond financial control. The VC in Company 1 appointed an 
independent supervisory board member. He had his own personal and legal basis for giving 
advice in the interest of all the firm's stakeholders. Neither of the VCs can give him orders, 
although he works closely with them. His fee is paid by Company 1 in contrast to the fee of the 
VC representative in Company 2, which is paid to Gilde. The latter, therefore, does not have such 
an independent position for its supervisory board member. The VC representatives in Company 1, 
i.e. the investment manager and the supervisory board member, get the same contractual data, 
only the latter specialises in face-to-face communication with the CEO. The investment manager 
stays in close contact (a half day per quarter) with the CEO and the supervisory board member, 
but continues to search for new deals. This situation is different for the VC in Company 2 that 
prefers to have its own people on the Supervisory Board. Here the representative monitors 
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contractual data and performs a sounding board function in addition to his role in looking for new 




This paper has sought to analyse how buy-outs improve their EO following the change in 
ownership and how VCs contribute to this process through the development of post-investment 
relationships. The paper also sought to validate the EO-model in the context of MBOs.  
 
The case studies show that buy-outs do occur where entrepreneurial opportunities exist and 
provide support for Wright et al. (2000) who argue that buyouts do not simply involve improving 
efficiency in companies in mature sectors. With the framework of EO we are able to identify 
entrepreneurial decisions and practices that add value to the business through new product/new 
market development in their companies that were frustrated by the parent prior to MBO. The 
firms in our study act more entrepreneurially than pre-MBO.  
 
VC's enhancement of EO in MBOs appears more likely in the following post-investment 
activities. First where the VCs intervene in integrating the contributions of specialists in top 
management decision-making; influencing leadership style of the CEO; keeping value added 
strategy on track; approving bonuses for top management; assisting in new ventures (consortia) / 
new acquisitions; and broadening market focus. They all frequently face situations where they 
have to advise on difficult problems or have to select consultants in order to implement 
appropriate strategies. This is an important field where the VC’s knowledge can contribute to the 
EO of the firm by developing the CEO's vision and keeping the strategy focused. Last but not 
least, the VC uses its network to reduce the negative impact of competition and to select key 
figures as CFOs and new CEOs. 
 
Secondly, where they put effort into reviewing and monitoring the quality of research and 
development investment plans, budgets and marketing plans. Sometimes the VC needs to invest 
in management information systems necessary to modernise management in order to control 
entrepreneurial decisions better.  
An important characteristic of the CEO-VC relation is the knowledge transfer and learning that 
takes place, indicating interdependency of the participating parties that enabled the companies to 
act entrepreneurially. It is crucial, however, for the VC to understand the technology sufficiently 
in order to be able to assess investment in product development and acquisitions and subsequently 
to monitor it effectively. Also the VCs must understand the complexity and the uncertainty 
entrepreneurs face and the way they take strategic decisions. The VC must be skilled in 
developing informal co-operative relationships that stimulate exchange of high quality 
information, which in turn enables reliable and convincing interventions that enhance EO. In 
these situations the articles of association and other contracts appear to have little impact on 
enhancing EO.   
As our case studies show, the success of post-investment relationships depends not only on 
effective informal relationships but also on the position of the VC as a majority shareholder. 
There is a need for further investigation of the post-investment involvement of the VCs to 
distinguish those buy-outs that can be better supervised with contractual relationships compared 
with those where greater emphasis on relationship building between the VC and CEO is likely to 
be more effective in enhancing EO.  
 
The EO-model has been validated in this study in the context of MBOs. We compared the EO of 
the firm pre- and post-MBO and observed similar patterns of increased pro-activeness, 
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innovativeness, risk taking and autonomy in two buy-outs which varied in terms of the VC's 
governance system, voting power of management and exit strategy. The EO-model is therefore 
appropriate for analysing MBOs with upside potential and the role of VCs in realising that 
potential. The multi-dimensionality of the model offers a variety of possibilities to relate the EO 
dimensions to external and organisational factors that affect the EO-performance relationship. 
Organisational factors such as strategy, resources, leadership styles and delegation moderate this 
relationship because the strength of the relationship between EO and performance varies as a 
function of these factors. The paper has extended the EO-model of Lumpkin and Dess to include 
variables that represent the financial and personal motivating mechanisms in MBOs, notably 
increased management holdings and interactions with the VC. In terms of the framework, these 
factors stimulate interaction between EO-dimensions and external/organisational factors in the 





Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs, and economic organization, American Economic 
Review 62, 777-795 
 
Amason A.C., H.J. Sapienza and S. Manigart, 1994, The level and nature of venture capitalist involvement in their 
portfolio companies: a study of three european countries, Managerial Finance, 20, 1, 1994, 3-17 
 
Bruining, J., 1992, Performance improvement after management buy-out, Phd Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
 
Carnevale, P. J. D., and Isen, A. M., 1986, The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of 
integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Process, 37, 1–
13. 
 
CMBOR, 2000 and 2001, Quarterly Review from The Centre for Management Buy-out Research, Nottingham 
University Business School 
 
Covin, J.G., and Slevin, D.P., 1986, The development and testing of an organizational level entrepreneurship scale. In: 
(Eds) Ronstadt et al, Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 
 
Covin, J.G., and Slevin, D.P., 1989, Strategic management of small firms in hostile and benign environments. Strategic 
Management Journal 10, 75-87 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M., (1989) Building theories from case study research, Academy of Management Review, 14, 4, 532-550 
 
Elango, B., V.H. Fried, R.D. Hisrich and A. Polonchek., 1995, How venture capital firms differ, Journal of Business 
Venturing, 10, 157-179 
 
EVCA (2001) Research paper: Survey of the economic and social impact of management buy-outs and buy-ins in 
Europe, European private Equity and Venture capital Association, Zaventum, Belgium 
 
Gorman, M. and W. Sahlman, 1989, What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business Venturing, 4, 231-248 
 
Green, S., 1992, The impact of ownership and capital structure on managerial motivation and strategy in management 
buy-outs: A Cultural Analysis, Journal of Management Studies 
 
Hatherly, D., Innes, J., Macandrew, J. and Mitchell, F., 1994, An exploration of the mbo-financial relationship. 
Corporate Governance, 2, 1, 20-9 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1989, Eclipse of the modern corporation. Harvard Business Review, 67, 5, 61-74 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of 
Finance, 48, 3 
 
 
   17
Littler, D.A. and Sweeting, R.C., 1989, Management accounting: the challenge of technology innovation-management 
accounting in technological business. Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, London 
 
Lumpkin, G.T. and Dess, G.G., 1996, Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and linking it to performance, 
Academy of Management Review. 21, 1, 135-172 
 
Macmillan, I.C., D.M. Kulow and Khoylian, R., 1989, Venture capitalists involvement in their investments: extent and 
performance, Journal of Business Venturing , 4, 27-47 
 
Miller, D., 1983, Entrepreneurship correlates in three types of firms. Management Science 29, 770-791 
Mitchell, F., G. Reid and N. Terry., 1999, Accounting information sytem development and the supply of venture 
capital. In: Management buy-outs and venture capital, editors M. Wright and K. Robbie, 263-279, 
Cheltenham UK/Northampton, MA, USA 
 
Phan, P., and Hill, C., 1995, Organizational restructuring and economic performance in leveraged buyouts: An ex post 
study. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 3, 704 -739 
 
Reid, G.C., 1996, Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers: an applied principal-agent 
analysis, Small Business Economics , 8, 1-14 
 
Robbie, K and M. Wright, 1996, Management buy-ins: entrepreneurship, active investors and corporate restructuring, 
MUP, Manchester 
  
Robbie, K and M. Wright, 1995, Managerial and ownership succession and corporate restructuring: the case of 
management buy-ins. Journal of Management Studies,  32, 527-550 
 
Rosenstein J., A.V. Bruno, W.D. Bygrave and N.T. Taylor., 1993, The ceo, venture capitalists and the board, Journal of 
Business Venturing , 8, 99-113 
 
Sapienza, H.J. and A.K. Gupta, 1994, Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-ceo interaction, 
Academy of Management Journal, 37, 6, 1618-1632 
 
Sahlman, A., 1990, The structure and governance of venture capital organizations. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 
473-521 
 
Sweeting , R.C. and Wong, C.F., 1997, A UK 'Handss-off' venture capital firm and the handling of post-investment 
investor-investee relationships, Journal of Management Studies 34, 1, 125-152 
 
Wright, M., Thompson, S., and Robbie, K., 1992, Venture capital and management led leveraged buy-outs: The 
European Perspective, Journal of Business Venturing, 7, 47-71 
 
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Thompson, S. and Starkey, K., 1994, Longevity and the life-cycle of mbo's. Strategic 
Management Journal, 15, 3, 215-227  
 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E., Busenitz, L.W. and J. Dial, 2000, Entrepreneurial growth through privatization: the 
upside of management buyouts, The Academy of Management Review, 25, 3, 591-601 
 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E. and Busenitz, L.W. 2001, Firm rebirth: Buyouts as facilitators of strategic growth and 
entrepreneurship, The Academy of Management Executive, 15, 111-125. 
 
Zahra, S.A. 1995, Corporate entrepreneurship and financial performance: the case of management leveraged buyouts 



























Table 1: Number and Total Value (€ mn) of Buy-outs in the Netherlands (1989-99) 
 
Year  1989  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 1999 
NR  52  36  44 50 55 41 57 56  61  69 42 

















































Table 2: Economic performance Company 1 (x Dfl 1000) 
 
Years  Net Profit / Sales x 100%  Net profit  Sales 
1992 1.1  1.051  96.587 
1993  0.2     178  74.385 
1994  0.1       58  60.356 
1995 5.5  3.351  61.156 
1996 5.7  3.350  59.046 
1997 4.3  2.602  61.099 
1998 6.3  4.090  65.284 
1999 9.6  6.652  69.016 




















































Table 3: Economic performance Company 2 (€ 1,000) 
3 
Year  EBIT as % of Sales  PBIT  Sales 
1993  11  1.011    8.711 
1994 17  1.799  10.638 
1995 4.8  590  12.264 
1996 10.1  1.271  12.533 
1997 11.6  1.569  13.537 
1998 13.3  1.875  14.048 
1999 13.2  2.847  21.562 















































Table 4: Summary of VC governance differences  
 
COMPANY 1  COMPANY 2  
Repay debt first; moderate dividend payment (6%)  Start-up finance; dividend paid if ROE > 25 percent  
Exit: sale to large industrial buyer in 2001  Exit: flotation NMAX in 1998 
CEO retired at the time of the sale   CEO sold equity stake at flotation and obtained 
position on the Supervisory Board; resigned after 2  
years 
VCs have majority of shares (co-lead)  VC has minority of shares 
VC: operational + strategic + financial experience  VC: financial and IT-start up experience    
No external specialist advice on strategy and 
organisation, but own advice 
External specialist on strategy and organisation 
Supervisory board member has his own position     
( independent from VC) 
Supervisory board member is investment manager 
(no independent position from VC) 
Dual governance system of VC: board member 
and investment manager separate persons with 
close contact 
No dual governance system of VC: board member 
and investment manager in one person 
Investment manager: controls contractual data; 
Board member: face-to-face interaction for 
equivocal issues 
One person from the VC controls contractual data 
and face-to-face interaction for equivocal issues 
VC with successful strategy intervention  VC not successful with intervention on market 
scope 
VC significant influence on CEO’s leadership 
style 
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1MBIs share the change in ownership with MBOs but in contrast to the latter external managers buy the firm. This may be an 
indication for the management’s lesser deep knowledge of the business. 
 
2This governance situation is quite similar with the dual form of governance in the UK. One of the differences is that a non-executive 
on behalf of the Dutch VC is appointed in the Supervisory Board as member or as chairman, but has no seat in the Board of Directors. 
Some VCs appoint their investment managers as Supervisory Board Member, others appoint professionals with entrepreneurial and 
industry experience. The Supervisory Board has the legal authority to defend the interest of the company as a whole. It is obligatory 
for public limited companies and facultative for private limited companies. The Supervisory Board has to approve the firm’s policy, 
the remuneration of the directors, whereas in the UK the shareholders control the company. New legislation will transfer some of the 
authorities of the Supervisory Board to General Meeting of Shareholders (e.g. settlement of annual report, appointment of Supervisory 
Board members). In Holland some VCs use a dual model for monitoring their investees: an investment managers who does the deal 
and takes care for the routine financial monitoring afterwards and an supervisory board member who takes care for the informal 
communication and coaching part. In our case studies Company 1 makes use of the dual model whereas Company 2 does not. 
 
3Source: flotation prospectus 31-3-98 and annual reports 1999 and 2000. 
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